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Abstract 
Medical scientists employ ‘quality assessment tools’ (QATs) to measure the quality 
of evidence from clinical studies, especially randomized controlled trials (RCTs). 
These tools are designed to take into account various methodological details of 
clinical studies, including randomization, blinding, and other features of studies 
deemed relevant to minimizing bias and error. There are now dozens available. The 
various QATs on offer differ widely from each other, and second-order empirical 
studies show that QATs have low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool reliability. 
This is an instance of a more general problem I call the underdetermination of 
evidential significance. Disagreements about the strength of a particular piece of 
evidence can be due to different—but in principle equally good—weightings of the 
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1  Introduction 
  
The diversity of evidence in modern medicine is amazing. Many causal hypotheses 
in medicine, for instance, have evidence generated from experiments on cell and 
tissue cultures, experiments on laboratory animals (alive at first, then dead, dissected, 
and analyzed), results of mathematical models, data from epidemiological studies of 
human populations, data from controlled clinical trials, and meta-level summaries 
from systematic reviews based on techniques such as meta-analysis and social 
processes such as consensus conferences. Moreover, each of these kinds of evidence 
has many variations. Epidemiological studies on humans, for instance, include case-
control studies, retrospective cohort studies, and prospective cohort studies.  
 Evidence from each of these diverse kinds of methods has varying degrees of 
credibility and relevance for a hypothesis of interest. It is crucial, in order to 
determine how compelling the available kinds of evidence are, and to make a well-
informed assessment of a causal hypothesis, that one take into account substantive 
details of the methods that generated the available evidence for that hypothesis. 
Methodological quality, in medical research at least, is typically defined as the extent 
to which the design, conduct, analysis, and report of a medical trial minimizes 
potential bias and error. Medical scientists attempt to account for the various 
dimensions of quality of evidence in a number of ways.  
 Methodological quality is a complex multi-dimensional property that one cannot 
simply intuit, and so formalized tools have been developed to aid in the assessment 
of the quality of medical evidence. Medical evidence is often assessed rather crudely 
by rank-ordering the types of methods according to an ‘evidence hierarchy’. 
Systematic reviews and specifically meta-analyses are typically at the top of such 
hierarchies, randomized controlled trials are near the top, non-randomized cohort and 
case-control studies are lower, and near the bottom are laboratory studies and 
anecdotal case reports.1 Evidence from methods at the top of this hierarchy, 
especially evidence from clinical trials, is often assessed with more fine-grained 
tools that I call quality assessment tools (QATs). There are many such tools now on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I discuss evidence hierarchies in more detail in §6. Such evidence hierarchies are commonly 
employed in evidence-based medicine. Examples include those of the Oxford Centre for Evidence-
Based Medicine, the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), and The Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) Working Group. These 
evidence hierarchies have recently received much criticism. See, for example, Bluhm (2005), Upshur 
(2005), Borgerson (2008), and La Caze (2011), and for a specific critique of placing meta-analysis at 
the top of such hierarchies, see Stegenga (2011). In footnote 4 below I cite several recent criticisms of 
the assumption that RCTs ought to be necessarily near the top of such hierarchies.  
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offer—QATs are quickly becoming an important tool of epidemiologists and other 
medical scientists. QATs are used to assess the primary-level evidence amalgamated 
by a systematic review, and since most causal hypotheses in medicine are assessed 
by evidence generated from systematic reviews, much of what we think we know 
about causal hypotheses in medicine is influenced by QATs.  
 A widely accepted norm holds that when determining the plausibility of a 
hypothesis one should take into account all of the available evidence. For hypotheses 
about medical interventions this principle stipulates that one ought to take into 
account the range of diverse kinds of evidence which are available for that 
hypothesis.2 A similar norm states that when determining the plausibility of a 
hypothesis one should take into account how compelling the various kinds of 
evidence available for that hypothesis are, by considering detailed qualitative 
features of the methods used to generate that evidence. The purpose of using a QAT 
is to evaluate the quality of evidence from medical trials and observational studies in 
such a fine-grained way. Their domain of application is relatively focused, therefore, 
since they do not apply to other kinds of evidence that is typically available for 
causal hypotheses in medicine (such as mechanistic evidence generated by basic 
science research, or results from experiments on animals), but for better or worse it is 
usually only RCTs, meta-analyses of RCTs, and sometimes observational studies 
that are considered when assessing causal hypotheses in medicine, and it is these 
types of methods that QATs are designed for.  
 A burgeoning literature has investigated the strategies that scientists employ 
when generating and assessing evidence. In what follows I examine the use of QATs 
as codified tools for assessing evidence in medical research. Although there has been 
some criticism of QATs in the medical literature, they have received little 
philosophical critique.3 I begin by describing general properties of QATs, including 
the methodological features that many QATs share and how QATs are typically 
employed (§2). I then turn to a discussion of empirical studies which test the inter-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The general norm is usually called the principle of total evidence, associated with Carnap (1947). 
See also Good (1967). Howick (2011) invokes the principle of total evidence for systematic reviews 
of evidence related to medical hypotheses. A presently unpublished paper by Bert Leuridan contains a 
good discussion of the principle of total evidence as it applies to medicine. 
3 Although one only needs to consider the prominence of randomization in QATs to see that QATs 
have, in fact, been indirectly criticized by the recent literature criticizing the assumed ‘gold standard’ 
status of RCTs (see footnote 4). In the present paper I do not attempt a thorough normative evaluation 
of any particular QAT. Considering the role of randomization suggests what a large task a thorough 
normative evaluation of a particular QAT would be. But for a systematic survey of the most 
prominent QATs, see West et al. (2002). See also Olivo et al. (2007) for an empirical critique of 
QATs. 
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rater reliability (§3) and inter-tool reliability (§4) of QATs: most QATs are not very 
good at constraining intersubjective assessments of hypotheses, and more worrying, 
the use of different QATs to assess the same primary evidence leads to widely 
divergent quality assessments of that evidence. This is an instance of a more general 
problem I call the underdetermination of evidential significance, which holds that in 
a rich enough empirical situation, the strength of the evidence is underdetermined 
(§5). Despite this problem, I defend the use of QATs in medical research. I end by 
comparing QATs to the widely employed evidence hierarchies, and argue that 
despite the problems with QATs, they are better than evidence hierarchies for 
assessing evidence in medicine (§6). 
 
 
2  Quality Assessment Tools 
  
A quality assessment tool (QAT) for medical evidence can be either a scale with 
elements that receive a quantitative score representing the degree to which each 
element is satisfied by a medical trial, or else a QAT can be simply a checklist with 
elements that are marked as either present or absent in a medical trial. Given the 
emphasis on randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medical research, most QATs 
are designed for the evaluation of RCTs, although there are several for observational 
studies and systematic reviews.4 Most QATs share several elements, including 
questions about how subjects were assigned to experimental groups in a trial, 
whether or not the subjects and experimenters were concealed to the subjects’ 
treatment protocol, whether or not there was a sufficient description of subject 
withdrawal from the trial groups, whether or not particular statistical analyses were 
performed, and whether or not a report of a trial disclosed financial relationships 
between investigators and companies.5 Most QATs provide instructions on how to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The view that RCTs are the ‘gold standard’ of evidence has recently been subjected to much 
philosophical criticism. See, for example, Worrall (2002), Worrall (2007), Cartwright (2007), and 
Cartwright (2010); for an assessment of the arguments for and against the gold standard status of 
RCTs, see Howick (2011). Observational studies also have QATs, such as QATSO (Quality 
Assessment Checklist for Observational Studies) and NOQAT (Newcastle-Ottawa Quality 
Assessment Scale – Case Control Studies). 
5 A note about terminology: sometimes the term ‘trial’ in the medical literature refers specifically to 
an experimental design (such as a randomized controlled trial) while the term ‘study’ refers to an 
observational design (such as a case control study), but this use is inconsistent. I will use both terms 
freely to refer to any method of generating ‘human level’ evidence in biomedical research, including 
both experimental and observational designs. 
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score the individual components of the QAT and how to determine an overall quality 
score of a trial.  
 A comprehensive list of QATs developed by the mid-1990s was described by 
Moher et al. (1995). The first scale type to be developed, known as the Chalmers 
scale, was published in 1981. By the mid-1990s there were over two dozen QATs, 
and by 2002 West et al. were able to identify 68 for RCTs or observational studies. 
Some are designed for the evaluation of any medical trial, while others are designed 
to assess specific trials, or trials from a particular medical sub-discipline. Some are 
designed to assess the quality of a trial itself, while others are designed to assess the 
quality of a report of a trial, but most assess both. 
 QATs are now widely used for several purposes. When performing a systematic 
review of the available evidence for a particular hypothesis, QATs help reviewers 
take the quality of medical studies into account. This is typically done in one of two 
ways. First, QAT scores can be used to generate a weighting factor for the technique 
known as meta-analysis. Meta-analysis usually involves calculating a weighted 
average of so-called effect sizes from individual medical studies, and the weighting 
of effect sizes can be determined by the score of the respective trial on a QAT.6 
Second, QAT scores can be used as an inclusion criterion for a systematic review, in 
which any primary-level trial that achieves a QAT score above a certain threshold 
would be included in the systematic review (and conversely, any trial that achieves a 
QAT score below such a threshold would be excluded). This application of QATs is 
perhaps the most common use to which they are put. Finally, QATs can be used for 
purposes not directly associated with a particular systematic review or meta-analysis, 
but rather to investigate relationships between QAT scores and other properties of 
medical trials. For instance, several findings suggest that there is an inverse 
correlation between QAT score and effect size (in other words, higher quality trials 
tend to have lower estimates of the efficacy of medical interventions).7 
 Why should medical scientists bother using QATs to assess evidence? Consider 
the following argument, similar to an argument for following the principle of total 
evidence, based on a concern to take into account any ‘defeating’ properties of one’s 
evidence. Suppose your evidence seems to provide definitive support for some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There are several commonly employed measures of effect size, including mean difference (for 
continuous variables), or odds ratio, risk ratio, or risk difference (for dichotomous variables). The 
weighting factor is sometimes determined by the QAT score, but a common method of determining 
the weight of a trial is simply based on the size of the trial (Egger, Smith, and Phillips, 1997), often by 
using the inverse variability of the data from a trial to measure that trial’s weight (because inverse 
variability is correlated with trial size). 
7 See, for example, Moher et al. (1998), Balk et al. (2002), and Hempel et al. (2011). 
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hypothesis, H1. But then you learn that there is a systematic error in the method 
which generated your evidence. Taking into account this systematic error, the 
evidence no longer supports H1 (perhaps instead the evidence supports a competitor 
hypothesis, H2). Had you not taken into account the fine-grained methodological 
information regarding the systematic error, you would have unwarranted belief in H1. 
You do not want to have unwarranted belief in a hypothesis, so you ought to take 
into account fine-grained methodological information. 
 Here is a related argument: if one does not take into account all of one’s 
evidence, including one’s old evidence, then one is liable to commit the base-rate 
fallacy. In terms of Bayes’ Theorem—p(H|e) = p(e|H)p(H)/p(e)—one commits the 
base-rate fallacy if one attempts to determine p(H|e) without taking into account 
p(H). Similarly, if one wants to determine p(H|e) then one ought to take into account 
the detailed methodological features which determine p(e|H) and p(e).  
 One need not be a Bayesian to see the importance of assessing evidence at a 
fine-grain with QATs. For instance, Mayo’s notion of ‘severe testing’, broadly based 
on aspects of frequentist statistics, also requires taking into account fine-grained 
methodological details. The Severity Principle, to use Mayo’s term, claims that 
“passing a test T (with e) counts as a good test of or good evidence for H just to the 
extent that H fits e and T is a severe test of H” (Mayo 1996). Attending to fine-
grained methodological details to ensure that one has minimized the probability of 
committing an error is central to ensuring that the test in question is severe, and thus 
that the Severity Principle is satisfied. So, regardless of one’s doctrinal commitment 
to Bayesianism or frequentism, the employment of tools like QATs to take into 
account detailed information about the methods used to generate the available 
evidence ought to seem reasonable. 
 One of the simplest QATs is the Jadad scale, first developed in the 1990s to 
assess clinical studies in pain research. Here it is, in full: 
1. Was the study described as randomized? 
2. Was the study described as double blind? 
3. Was there a description of withdrawals and dropouts? 
A ‘yes’ to question 1 and question 2 is given one point each. A ‘yes’ to question 3, in 
addition to a description of the number of withdrawals and dropouts in each of the 
trial sub-groups, and an explanation for the withdrawals or dropouts, receives one 
point. An additional point is given if the method of randomization is described in the 
paper, and the method is deemed appropriate. A final point is awarded if the method 
of blinding is described, and the method is deemed appropriate. Thus, a trial can 
receive between zero and five points on the Jadad scale.  
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 The Jadad scale has been praised by some as being easy to use—it takes about 
ten minutes to complete for each study—which is an obvious virtue when a reviewer 
must assess hundreds of studies for a particular hypothesis. On the other hand, others 
complain that it is too simple, and that it has low inter-rater reliability (discussed in 
§3). I describe the tool here not to assess it but merely to provide an example of a 
QAT for illustration.  
 In contrast to the simplicity of the Jadad scale, the Chalmers scale has 30 
questions in several categories, which include the trial protocol, the statistical 
analysis, and the presentation of results. Similarly, the QAT developed by Cho and 
Bero (1994) has 24 questions. At a coarse grain some of the features on the Chalmers 
QAT and the Cho and Bero QAT are similar to the basic elements of the Jadad QAT: 
these scales both include questions about randomization, blinding, and subject 
withdrawal. (In §5 I briefly describe how Cho and Bero developed their QAT, as an 
illustration of the no-best-weighting argument). In addition, these more detailed 
QATs include questions about statistical analyses, control subjects, and other 
methodological features deemed relevant to minimizing systematic error. These 
QATs usually take around 30 to 40 minutes to complete for each study. Despite the 
added complexity of these more detailed QATs, their scoring systems are kept as 
simple as possible. For instance, most of the questions on the Cho and Bero QAT 
allow only the following answers: ‘yes’ (2 points), ‘partial’ (1 point), ‘no’ (0 points), 
and ‘not applicable’ (0 points). This is meant to constrain the amount of subjective 
judgment required when generating a QAT score. 
 Although most QATs share at least several similar features, the relative weight 
of the overall score given to the various features differs widely between QATs. Table 
1 lists the relative weight of three central methodological features—subject 
randomization, subject allocation concealment (or ‘blinding’), and description of 
subject withdrawal—for the above QATs, in addition to three other QATs.  
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Table 1. Number of methodological features used in six QATs, and weight assigned 










Chalmers et al. (1981) 30 13.0 26.0 7.0 
Jadad et al. (1996) 3 40.0 40.0 20.0 
Cho & Bero (1994) 24 14.3 8.2 8.2 
Reisch et al. (1989) 34 5.9 5.9 2.9 
Spitzer et al. (1990) 32 3.1 3.1 9.4 
Linde et al. (1997) 7 28.6 28.6 28.6 
 
 
Note two aspects of Table 1. First, the number of items on a QAT is highly variable, 
from 3 to 34. Second, the weight given to particular methodological features is also 
highly variable. Randomization, for instance, constitutes 3.1% of the overall score on 
the QAT designed by Spitzer et al. (1990), whereas it constitutes 40% of the overall 
score on the QAT designed by Jadad et al. (1996). The differences between QATs 
explains the low inter-tool reliability, which I describe in §4. But first I describe the 
low inter-rater reliability of QATs. 
 
 
3  Inter-Rater Reliability 
  
The extent to which multiple users of the same rating system achieve similar ratings 
is usually referred to as ‘inter-rater reliability’. Empirical evaluations of the inter-
rater reliability of QATs have shown a wide disparity in the outcomes of a QAT 
when applied to the same primary-level study by multiple reviewers; that is, the 
inter-rater reliability of QATs is, usually, poor.  
 The typical set-up of evaluations of inter-rater reliability of a QAT is simple: 
give a set of manuscripts to multiple reviewers who have been trained to use the 
QAT, and compare the quality scores assigned by these reviewers to each other. A 
statistic called kappa (κ) is typically computed which provides a measure of 
agreement between the quality scores produced by the QAT from the multiple 
reviewers (although other statistics measuring agreement are also used, such as 
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Kendall’s coefficient of concordance and the intraclass correlation coefficient).8 
Sometimes the manuscripts are blinded as to who the authors were and what journals 
the manuscripts were published in, but sometimes the manuscripts are not blinded, 
and sometimes both blinded and non-blinded manuscripts are assessed to evaluate 
the effect of blinding. In some cases the manuscripts all pertain to the same 
hypothesis, while in other cases the manuscripts pertain to various subjects within a 
particular medical sub-discipline.  
 For example, Clark et al. (1999) assessed the inter-rater reliability of the Jadad 
scale, using four reviewers to evaluate the quality of 76 manuscripts of RCTs. Inter-
rater reliability was found to be “poor”, but it increased substantially when the third 
item of the scale (explanation of withdrawal from study) was removed and only the 
remaining two questions were employed. 
 A QAT known as the ‘risk of bias tool’ was devised by the Cochrane 
Collaboration (a prominent organization in the so-called evidence-based medicine 
movement) to assess the degree to which the results of a study “should be believed.” 
A group of medical scientists subsequently assessed the inter-rater reliability of the 
risk of bias tool. They distributed 163 manuscripts of RCTs among five reviewers, 
who assessed the RCTs with this tool, and they found the inter-rater reliability of the 
quality assessments to be very low (Hartling et al. 2009). 
 Similarly, Hartling et al. (2011) used three QATs (Risk of Bias tool, Jadad scale, 
Schulz allocation concealment) to assess 107 studies on a medical intervention (the 
use of inhaled corticosteriods for adults with persistent asthma). This group 
employed two independent reviewers who scored the 107 studies using the three 
QATs. They found that inter-rater reliability was ‘moderate’. However, the claim 
that inter-rater reliability was moderate was based on a standard scale in which a κ 
measure between 0.41 - 0.6 is deemed moderate. The κ measure in this paper was 
0.41, so it was just barely within the range deemed moderate. The next lower 
category, with a κ measure between 0.21 - 0.4, is deemed ‘fair’ by this standard 
scale. But at least in the context of measuring inter-rater reliability of QATs, a κ of 
0.4 represents wide disagreement between reviewers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For simplicity I will describe Cohen’s Kappa, which measures the agreement of two reviewers who 
classify items into discrete categories, and is computed as follows: 
 κ = [p(a) – p(e)]/[1 – p(e)] 
where p(a) is the probability of agreement (based on the observed frequency of agreement) and p(e) is 
the probability of chance agreement (also calculated using observed frequency data). Kappa was first 
introduced as a statistical measure by Cohen (1960). For more than two reviewers, a measure called 
Fleiss’ Kappa can be used. I give an example of a calculation of κ below.  
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 Here is a toy example to illustrate the disagreement that a κ measure of 0.4 
represents. Suppose two teaching assistants, Beth and Sara, are grading the same 
class of 100 students, and must decide whether or not each student passes or fails. 
Their joint distribution of grades is: 
        Sara 
       Pass Fail 
 Beth   Pass 40  10   
     Fail  20  30 
Of the 100 students, they agree on passing 40 students and failing 30 others, thus 
their frequency of agreement is 0.7. But the probability of random agreement is 0.5, 
because Beth passes 50% of the students and Sara passes 60% of the students, so the 
probability that Beth and Sara would agree on passing a randomly chosen student is 
0.5	  × 0.6 (= 0.3), and similarly the probability that Beth and Sara would agree on 
failing a randomly chosen student is 0.5 × 0.4 (= 0.2) (and so the overall probability 
of agreeing on passing or failing a randomly chosen student is 0.3 + 0.2 = 0.5). 
Applying the kappa formula gives: 
 (0.7 - 0.5)/(1 - 0.5) = 0.4 
Importantly, Beth and Sara disagree about 30 students regarding a relatively simple 
property (passing). It is natural to suppose that they disagree most about ‘borderline’ 
students, and their disagreement is made stark because Beth and Sara have a blunt 
evaluative tool (pass/fail grades rather than, say, letter grades). But a finer-grained 
evaluative tool would not necessarily mitigate such disagreement, since there would 
be more categories about which they could disagree for each student; a finer-grained 
evaluative tool would increase, rather than decrease, the number of borderline cases 
(because there are borderline cases between each letter grade). This example is 
meant to illustrate that a κ measure of 0.4 represents poor agreement between two 
reviewers.9 A κ score is fundamentally an arbitrary measure of disagreement, and the 
significance of the disagreement that a particular κ score represents presumably 
varies with context. This example, I nevertheless hope, helps to illustrate the extent 
of disagreement found in empirical assessments of the inter-rater reliability of QATs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I owe Jonah Schupbach thanks for noting that a κ measure can not only seem inappropriately low, as 
in the above cases of poor inter-rater reliability, but can seem inappropriately high as well. If a κ 
measure approaches 1, this might suggest agreement which is ‘too good to be true’. Returning to my 
toy example, if Beth and Sara had a very high a κ measure, then one might wonder if they colluded in 
their grading. Thus when using a κ statistic to assess inter-rater reliability, we should hope for a κ 
measure above some minimal threshold (below which indicates too much disagreement) but below 
some maximum threshold (above which indicates too much agreement). What exactly these 
thresholds should be are beyond the scope of this paper (and are, I suppose, context sensitive).  
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 In short, different users of the same QAT, when assessing the same evidence, 
generate diverging assessments of the strength of that evidence. In most tests of the 
inter-rater reliability of QATs, the evidence being assessed comes from a narrow 
range of study designs (usually all the studies are RCTs), and the evidence is about a 
narrow range of subject matter (usually all the studies are about the same causal 
hypothesis regarding a particular medical intervention). The poor inter-rater 
reliability is even more striking considering the narrow range of study designs and 
subject matter from which the evidence is generated.  
 
 
4  Inter-Tool Reliability 
 
The extent to which multiple instruments have correlated measurements when 
applied to the same property being measured is referred to as inter-tool reliability. 
One QAT has inter-tool reliability with respect to another if its measurement of the 
quality of medical studies correlates with the measurement of the quality of the same 
studies by the other QAT. A QAT score is a measure on a relatively arbitrary scale, 
and the scales between multiple QATs are incommensurable, so constructs such as 
‘high quality’ and ‘low quality’ are developed for each QAT which allow the results 
from different QATs to be compared. That is, when testing the inter-tool reliability 
of multiple QATs, what is usually being compared is the extent of their agreement 
regarding the categorization of particular medical trials into pre-defined bins of 
quality. Similar to assessments of inter-rater reliability, empirical evaluations of the 
inter-tool reliability have shown a wide disparity in the outcomes of multiple QATs 
when applied to the same primary-level studies; that is, the inter-tool reliability of 
QATs is poor. I should note, however, that there are few such assessments available, 
and those published thus far have varied with respect to the particular QATs 
assessed, the design of the reliability assessment, and the statistical analyses 
employed.10 
 An extensive investigation of inter-tool reliability was performed by Jüni and 
colleagues (1999). They amalgamated data from 17 studies which had tested a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For this latter reason I refrain from describing or illustrating the particular statistical analyses 
employed in tests of the inter-tool reliability of QATs, as I did in §3 on tests of the inter-rater 
reliability of QATs. Nearly every published test of inter-rater reliability uses a different statistic to 
measure agreement of quality assessment between tools. Analyses include Kendall’s rank correlation 
coefficient (τ), Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W), and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
(ρ). 
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particular medical intervention (the use of low molecular weight heparin to prevent 
post-operative thrombosis), and they used 25 QATs to assess the quality of these 17 
studies (thereby effectively performing 25 meta-analyses). The QATs that this group 
used were the same that Moher et al. (1995) had earlier described, which varied in 
the number of assessed study attributes, from a low of three attributes to a high of 34, 
and varied in the weight given to the various study attributes. Jüni and his colleagues 
noted that “most of these scoring systems lack a focused theoretical basis.” Their 
results were troubling: the amalgamated effect sizes between these 25 meta-analyses 
differed by up to 117%—using exactly the same primary evidence. They found that 
medical trials deemed high quality according to one QAT could be deemed low 
quality according to another. The authors concluded that “the type of scale used to 
assess trial quality can dramatically influence the interpretation of meta-analytic 
studies.” 
 Perhaps the most recent evaluation of inter-tool reliability is Hartling et al. 
(2011), discussed above in §3. Recall that this group used three QATs (Risk of Bias 
tool, Jadad scale, Schulz allocation concealment) to assess 107 trials on a particular 
medical intervention. They also found that the inter-tool reliability was very low.  
 Yet another example of a test of inter-tool reliability of QATs was reported by 
Moher et al. (1996). This group used six QATs to evaluate 12 trials of a medical 
intervention. Again, the inter-tool reliability was found to be low. 
 Low inter-tool reliability of QATs is troubling: it is a quantitative empirical 
demonstration that the determination of the quality of a medical trial depends on the 
choice of QAT. Moreover, in §2 I noted that there are many QATs available, and 
between them there are substantial differences in their design. Thus the best tools 
that medical scientists have to determine the strength of evidence generated by what 
are typically deemed the best study designs (RCTs) are relatively unconstraining and 
liable to produce conflicting assessments. Such low inter-tool reliability of QATs has 
important practical consequences. Elsewhere I show that multiple meta-analyses of 
the same primary evidence can reach contradictory conclusions regarding particular 
causal hypotheses, and one of the conditions which permits such malleability of 
meta-analysis is the choice of QAT (Stegenga 2011).11 The discordant results from 
the 25 meta-analyses performed by Moher et al. (1995) are a case in point. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Low inter-tool reliability of QATs is only one of several problems with meta-analysis. Other 
parameters of meta-analysis that render this method malleable include the choice of primary-level 
studies to include in the analysis, the choice of outcome measure to employ, the choice of kind of data 
to amalgamated (patient-level or study-level), and the choice of averaging technique to employ. See 
Stegenga (2011) for a critical account of meta-analysis.  
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Moreover, this low inter-tool reliability has philosophical consequences, which I 
explore in §5. 
 Such low inter-tool reliability might be less troubling if the various QATs had 
distinct domains of application. The many biases present in medical research are 
pertinent to varying degrees depending on the details of the particular circumstances 
at hand, and so one might think that it is a mistake to expect that one QAT ought to 
apply to all circumstances. For some causal hypotheses, for instance, it is difficult or 
impossible to conceal the treatment from the experimental subjects and/or the 
investigators (that is, ‘blinding’ is sometimes impossible)—hypotheses regarding 
chiropractic spinal manipulation are a case in point. Thus, no study relevant to such a 
hypothesis will score well on a QAT that gives a large weight to allocation 
concealment. Such a QAT would be less sensitive to the presence or absence of 
sources of bias other than lack of allocation concealment, relative to QATs that give 
little or no weight to allocation concealment. In such a case one might argue that 
since the absence of allocation concealment is fixed among the relevant studies, an 
appropriate QAT to use in this case should not give any weight to allocation 
concealment, and would only ask about the presence of those properties of a study 
that might vary among the relevant studies. On the other hand, one might argue that 
since we have principled reasons for thinking that the absence of allocation 
concealment can bias the results of a study, even among those studies that cannot 
possibly conceal subject allocation, an appropriate QAT to use in this case should 
evaluate the presence of allocation concealment (in which case all of the relevant 
studies would simply receive a zero score on allocation concealment), just as a QAT 
ought to evaluate the presence of allocation concealment in a scenario in which the 
studies in fact can conceal subject allocation. The former consideration is an appeal 
to determining the relative quality between studies, and the latter consideration is an 
appeal to determining the absolute quality of studies. The latter consideration should 
be more compelling in most cases, since, as discussed above, the typical use of 
QATs is to help estimate the true efficacy of a medical intervention, and such 
estimates ought to take into account the full extent of the potential for biases in the 
relevant evidence, regardless of whether or not it was possible for the respective 
studies to avoid such biases.  
 There are scenarios, though, in which we might have reasons to think that a 
property of a study that causes bias in other scenarios does not cause bias (or perhaps 
causes less bias) in these scenarios. For example, the placebo effect might be 
stronger in studies that are designed to assess the benefits of pharmaceuticals 
compared with studies that are designed to assess the harms of pharmaceuticals. 
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Such a difference could be independently and empirically tested. If this were true, 
then the different scenarios would indeed warrant different QATs, suitable for the 
particularities of the scenario at hand. If the low inter-tool reliability of QATs were 
merely the result of employing multiple QATs to different kinds of empirical 
scenarios (different kinds of studies, say, or studies of different kinds of hypotheses, 
such as benefits versus harms of pharmaceuticals), then such low inter-tool reliability 
would hardly be troubling. Indiscriminate use of QATs might lead to low inter-tool 
reliability, such thinking would go, but discriminate use would not.   
 Similarly, low inter-tool reliability of QATs would be less troubling if one could 
show that in principle there is only one good QAT for a given domain, or at least a 
small set of good ones which are similar to each other in important respects, because 
then one could dismiss the observed low inter-tool reliability as an artefact caused by 
the inclusion of poor QATs in addition to the good ones. 
 Unfortunately, on the whole, these considerations do not mitigate the problem of 
low inter-tool reliability of QATs. There are, in fact, a plurality of equally fine 
QATs, designed for the same kinds of scenarios (typically: assessing RCTs of the 
efficacy of pharmaceuticals). A systematic review by medical scientists concluded 
that there were numerous QATs that “represent acceptable approaches that could be 
used today without major modifications” (West et al. 2002). Moreover, all of the 
empirical demonstrations of their low inter-tool reliability involve the assessment of 
the quality of studies from a very narrow domain: for instance, the low inter-tool 
reliability of QATs shown in Jüni et al. (1999) involved assessing studies of a single 
design (RCTs) about a single causal hypothesis, and these QATs had been developed 
with the purpose of assessing the quality of that very study design. Although there 
are some QATs which are arguably inferior to others, at least among the reasonably 
good ones I argue below that we lack a theoretical basis for distinguishing among 
them, and so we are stuck with a panoply of acceptable QATs which disagree widely 
about the quality of particular medical studies and thus the strength of the evidence 
generated from those studies. 
 One might agree with the view that there is no uniquely best QAT, but be 
tempted to think that this is due only to the fact that the quality of a study depends on 
particularities of the context (e.g. the particular kind of study in question and the 
form of the hypothesis being tested by that study). Different QATs might, according 
to this thought, be optimally suited to different contexts. While this latter point is no 
doubt true—above I noted that some QATs are designed for assessing particular 
kinds of studies, and others are designed for assessing studies in particular domains 
of medicine—it does not explain the low inter-tool reliability of QATs. That is 
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because, as above, the low inter-tool reliability of QATs is demonstrated in narrowly 
specified contexts. Moreover, the research groups that design QATs usually claim 
(explicitly) that their QATs are meant to be applicable to a given study design 
(usually RCTs) in almost any domain of medical research. In short, QATs are 
intended to apply to a broad range of contexts, but regardless, the empirical 
demonstrations of their low inter-tool reliability are almost always constrained to a 
single particular context. 
 Despite their widespread and growing use, among medical scientists there is 
some debate about whether or not QATs ought to be employed at all (see, for 
example, Herbison et al. (2006)). Their low inter-rater and inter-tool reliability might 
suggest that resistance to their use is warranted. There are three reasons, however, 
that justify the continuing improvement and application of QATs to assessing the 
quality of medical evidence. First, when performing a meta-analysis, a decision to 
not use an instrument to differentially weight the quality of the primary-level studies 
is equivalent to weighting all the primary-level studies to an equal degree. So 
whether one wishes to or not, when performing a meta-analysis one is forced, in 
principle, to weight the primary-level studies, and the remaining question then is 
simply how arbitrary one’s method of weighting is. Assigning equal weights 
regardless of methodological quality is maximally arbitrary. The use of QATs to 
differentially weight primary-level studies is an attempt to minimize such 
arbitrariness. Second, as argued in §2 above, one must account for fine-grained 
methodological features in order to guarantee that one avoids potential defeating 
properties of evidence, and QATs can help with this. Third—but closely related to 
the second point—there is some empirical evidence which suggests that studies of 
lower quality have a tendency to over-estimate the efficacy of medical interventions 
(see footnote 7), and thus the use of QATs helps to accurately estimate the efficacy 
of medical interventions. In short, despite their low inter-rater and inter-tool 
reliability, QATs are an important component of medical research, and should be 
employed when performing a systematic review or meta-analysis. 
 
 
5  Underdetermination of Evidential Significance 
  
The primary use of QATs is to estimate the quality of evidence from particular 
medical studies, and the primary use of such evidence is to estimate the strength (if 
any) of causal relations in relevant domains. The relata in these purported causal 
relations are, of course, the medical intervention under investigation and the change 
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in value of one or more parameters of a group of subjects. The best available QATs 
appropriate to a given domain differ substantially in the weight assigned to various 
methodological properties (§2), and thus generate discordant estimates of evidential 
quality when applied to the same evidence (§4). The differences between the best 
available QATs are fundamentally arbitrary. Although I assume that there must be a 
unique value (if at all) to the strength of purported causal relations in the domains in 
which these tools are employed, the low inter-tool reliability of QATs—together 
with the fundamentally arbitrary differences of their content—suggests that, in such 
domains and for such relations, there is no uniquely correct estimate of the quality of 
evidence.  This is an instance of the general problem I call the underdetermination of 
evidential significance. 
 Disagreement regarding the strength of evidence in particular scientific domains 
has been frequently documented with historical case studies. One virtue of 
examining the disagreement generated by the use of QATs is that such 
disagreements occur in highly controlled settings, are quantifiable using measures 
such as the κ statistic, and are about subjects of great importance. Such 
disagreements do not necessarily represent shortcoming on the part of the 
disagreeing scientists, and nor do such disagreements necessarily suggest a crude 
relativism. Two scientists who disagree about the strength of a particular piece of 
evidence can both be rational because their differing assessments of the strength of 
the same evidence can be due to their different weightings of fine-grained features of 
the methods which generated the evidence. This explains (at least in part) the low 
inter-rater and inter-tool reliability of QATs.  
 Concluding that there is no uniquely correct determination of the epistemic 
significance of some piece of evidence by appealing to the poor inter-rater and inter-
tool reliability of QATs is not merely an argument from disagreement. If it were, 
then the standard objection would simply note that the mere fact of disagreement 
about a particular subject does not imply that there is no correct or uniquely best 
view on the subject. Although different QATs disagree about the strength of 
evidence from a particular trial, this does not imply that there is no true or best view 
regarding the strength of evidence from this particular trial—goes the standard 
objection—since the best QATs might agree with each other about the evidence from 
this trial, and even more ambitiously, agreement or disagreement among QATs 
would be irrelevant if we just took into account the quality assessment of this 
particular trial by the uniquely best QAT. The burden that this objection faces is the 
identification of the single best QAT or at least the set of good ones (and then hope 
that multiple users of the best QAT will have high inter-rater reliability, or that the 
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set of good QATs will have high inter-tool reliability). As noted in §4, medical 
scientists involved in the development and assessment of QATs claim that there are 
simply a plurality of decent QATs that differ from one another in arbitrary respects. 
More fundamentally, we lack a theory of scientific inference that would allow us to 
referee between the most sophisticated QATs. Recall the different weightings of the 
particular methodological features assessed in QATs, noted in Table 1. Another way 
to state the burden of the ‘mere argument by disagreement’ objection is that to 
identify the best QATs, one would have to possess a principled method of 
determining the optimal weights for the methodological features included on a QAT. 
That we do not presently have such a principled method is an understatement.  
 Consider this compelling illustration of the arbitrariness involved in the 
assignment of weights to methodological features in QATs. Cho and Bero (1994) 
employed three different algorithms for weighting the methodological features of 
their QAT (discussed in §2). Then they tested the three weighting algorithms for 
their effect on quality scores of medical trials, and their effect on the inter-rater 
reliability of such scores. They selected for further use—with no principled basis—
the weighting algorithm that had the highest inter-rater reliability. Cho and Bero 
explicitly admitted that nothing beyond the higher inter-rater reliability warranted the 
choice of this weighting algorithm, and they rightfully claimed that such arbitrariness 
was justified because “there is little empiric [sic] evidence on the relative importance 
of the individual quality criteria to the control of systematic bias.”12 Medical 
scientists have no principled foundation for developing a uniquely good QAT, and so 
resort to a relatively arbitrary basis for their development. 
 One could press the standard objection by noting that while it is true that we 
presently lack an inductive theory that could provide warrant for a unique system for 
weighting the various methodological features, it is overly pessimistic to think that 
we will never have a principled basis for identifying a uniquely best weighting 
system. It is plausible, this objection goes, to think that someday we will have a 
uniquely best QAT, or perhaps uniquely best QATs for particular kinds of epistemic 
scenarios, and we could thereby achieve agreement regarding the strength of 
evidence from medical studies. To this one would have to forgive those medical 
scientists, dissatisfied with this response, who are concerned with assessing evidence 
today. But there is another, deeper reason why such a response is not compelling.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There is a tendency among medical scientists to suppose that the relative importance of various 
methodological features is merely an empirical matter. One need not entirely sympathize with such 
methodological naturalism to agree with the point expressed by Cho and Bero here: we lack reasons 
to prefer one weighting of methodological features over another, regardless of whether one thinks of 
these reasons as empirical or principled.  
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 It is not a mere argument from present disagreement—I reiterate—to claim that 
the poor inter-tool reliability of QATs implies that the strength of evidence from 
particular medical studies is underdetermined. That is because, as the example of the 
Cho and Bero QAT suggests, the disagreements between QATs are due to arbitrary 
differences in how the particular methodological features are weighed in the various 
QATs. There are, to be sure, better and worse QATs. But that is about as good as one 
can do when it comes to distinguishing between QATs. Of those that account for the 
majority of relevant methodological features, some weight those features in a slightly 
different manner than others, and we have no principled grounds for preferring one 
weighting over another. We do not possess a theory of scientific inference that could 
help determine the weights of the methodological features in QATs. If one really 
wanted to, one could sustain the objection by claiming that it is possible that in the 
future we will develop a theory of inference which would allow us to identify a 
uniquely best QAT. There is a point at which one can no longer argue against 
philosophical optimism. The underdetermination of evidential significance is a hard 
problem; like other hard philosophical problems, it does not preclude optimism. 
 One could put aside the aim of finding a principled basis for selecting among the 
available QATs, and instead perform a selection based on their historical 
performance. Call this a ‘naturalist’ selection of QATs.13 Since QATs are employed 
to estimate the quality of evidence from medical studies, and such evidence is used 
to estimate the strength of causal relations, the naturalist approach would involve 
selecting QATs based on a parameter determined by the ‘fit’ between (i) the strength 
of presently known causal relations and (ii) the quality of the evidence for such 
causal relations available at a particular time, as determined in retrospect by 
currently available QATs. The best QAT would be the one with the best average fit 
between (i) and (ii). Such an assessment of QATs would be of some value. It would 
be fundamentally limited, though, given an epistemic circularity. In the domains in 
which QATs are employed, the best epistemic access to the strength of causal 
relations is the total evidence from all the available medical studies, summarized by 
a careful systematic review (which, in this domain, usually takes the form of a meta-
analysis), appropriately weighted to take into account relevant methodological 
features of those studies. But of course, those very weightings are generated by 
QATs. The naturalist approach to assessing QATs, then, itself requires the 
employment of QATs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Such an approach was first suggested to me by Jim Tabery. 
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 The underdetermination of evidential significance is not the same problem that 
is often associated with Duhem and Quine. One formulation of the standard 
underdetermination problem—underdetermination of theory by evidence—holds that 
there are multiple theories compatible with a given body of evidence. The 
underdetermination of evidential significance is the prior problem of settling on the 
strength of a given piece of evidence in the first place. Indeed, one may wish to say 
that an appropriate name for the present problem is just the inverse of the Quinean 
locution: underdetermination of evidence by theory. Our best theories of inference 
underdetermine the strength of evidence, exemplified by tools such as QATs. 
 
 
6  QATs and Hierarchies 
  
The most frequently used tools for assessing the quality of medical studies are not 
QATs, but rather evidence hierarchies. An evidence hierarchy is a rank-ordering of 
kinds of methods according to the potential for bias in that kind of method. The 
potential for bias is usually based on one or very few parameters of study designs, 
most prominently randomization. QATs and evidence hierarchies are not mutually 
exclusive, since an evidence hierarchy can be employed to generate a rank-ordering 
of types of methods, and then QATs can be employed to evaluate the quality of 
tokens of those methods. However, judicious use of QATs should replace evidence 
hierarchies altogether. The best defense of evidence hierarchies that I know of is 
given by Howick (2011), who promotes a sophisticated version of hierarchies in 
which the rank-ordering of a particular study can increase or decrease depending on 
parameters distinct from the parameter first used to generate the ranking. Howick’s 
suggestion, and any evidence hierarchy consistent with his suggestion (such as that 
of GRADE), ultimately amounts to an outright abandonment of evidence hierarchies. 
Howick gives conditions for when mechanistic evidence and evidence from non-
randomized studies should be considered, and also suggests that sometimes evidence 
from RCTs should be doubted. If one takes into account methodological nuances of 
medical research, in the ways that Howick suggests or otherwise, then the metaphor 
of a hierarchy of evidence and its utility in assessing quality of evidence seem less 
compelling than more quantitative tools like QATs.  
 For instance, the GRADE evidence hierarchy employs more than one property 
to rank methods. GRADE starts with a quality assignment based on one property and 
takes other properties into account by subsequent modifications of the quality 
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assignment (shifting the assignment up or down). Formally, the use of n properties to 
rank methods is equivalent to a scoring system based on n properties which discards 
any information that exceeds what is required to generate a ranking. QATs generate 
scores that are measured on scales more informative than ordinal scales (such as 
interval, ratio, or absolute scales). From any measure on one of these supra-ordinal 
scales, a ranking can be inferred on an ordinal scale, but not vice versa (from a 
ranking on an ordinal scale it is impossible to infer measures on supra-ordinal 
scales). Thus hierarchies (including the more sophisticated ones such as GRADE) 
provide evaluations of evidence which are necessarily less informative than 
evaluations provided by QATs.  
 Moreover, because these sophisticated hierarchies begin with a quality 
assignment based on one methodological property and then shift the quality 
assignment by taking other properties into account, the weights that can be assigned 
to various methodological properties are constrained. With QATs, on the other hand, 
the weight assigned to any methodological property is completely open, and can be 
determined based on rational arguments regarding the respective importance of the 
various properties, without arbitrary constraints imposed by the structure of the 
scoring system. In short, despite the widespread use of evidence hierarchies and the 
defense of such use by Howick (2011), and despite the problems that I raise for 
QATs above, QATs are superior to evidence hierarchies for assessing the great 
volume of evidence in contemporary medical research. 
 
 
7  Conclusion 
  
An examination of QATs suggests that coarse-grained features of evidence in 
medicine, like freedom from systematic error, are themselves amalgams of a 
complex set of considerations; that is why QATs take into account a plurality of 
methodological features such as randomization and blinding. The various aspects of 
a specific empirical situation which can influence an assessment of a coarse-grained 
evidential feature are numerous, often difficult to identify and articulate, and if they 
can be identified and articulated (as one attempts to do with QATs), they can be 
evaluated by different scientists to varying degrees and by different quality 
assessment tools to various degrees. In short, there are a variety of features of 
evidence that must be considered when assessing evidence, and there are numerous 
and potentially contradictory ways to do so. Our  best theories of scientific inference 
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provide little guidance on how to weigh the relevant methodological features 
included in tools like QATs.  
 A group of medical scientists prominent in the literature on QATs notes that 
“the quality of controlled trials is of obvious relevance to systematic reviews” but 
that “the methodology for both the assessment of quality and its incorporation into 
systematic reviews are a matter of ongoing debate” (Jüni, Altman, and Egger, 2001). 
I have argued that the use of QATs are important to minimize arbitrariness when 
assessing medical evidence and to accurately estimate probabilities associated with 
measures of confirmation. However, available QATs vary in their constitutions, and 
when medical evidence is assessed using QATs their inter-rater reliability and inter-
tool reliability is low. This, in turn, is a compelling illustration of a more general 
problem: the underdetermination of evidential significance. Disagreements about the 
strength of evidence are, of course, ubiquitous in science. Such disagreement is 
especially striking, however, when it results from the employment of carefully 
codified tools designed to quantitatively assess the strength of evidence. QATs are 
currently the best instruments available to medical scientists to assess the strength of 
evidence, yet when applied to what is purported to be the best quality evidence in 
medicine (namely, evidence from RCTs), different users of the same QAT, and 
different QATs applied to the same evidence, lead to widely discordant assessments 
of the strength of evidence.  
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